Laxmi Tanuja Siliveru & Megha Kedia
One of the objectives of the proposed 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2025, is that the conduct and character of ministers should be “beyond any ray of suspicion .” The bill further states that a minister facing criminal charges could compromise “constitutional morality”, undermine “principles of good governance”, or erode trust in public places. This, in itself, makes the bill highly questionable, because it is a well-known fact that many elected ministers face criminal charges, whether related to corruption or other issues. It raises a question: is it really about upholding “constitutional morality”, or is it a way to stifle the opposition’s voice?
The amendment attempts to institutionalise “constitutional morality” in politics by disqualifying elected representatives facing serious criminal charges. If a minister is in custody for more than 30 days on charges punishable with five years or more, they face automatic removal from the office. At first glance, it may appear to be a noble effort to “cleanse politics”. But scratch beneath the surface, and the danger becomes clear.
The amendment does exactly contrary of what it professes to do. Instead of strengthening “constitutional morality”, it undermines the essence of constitutionalism, i.e. to check the power of the state. Constitutional morality upholds the values enshrined in the Constitution. It professes safeguards against exercises of power and majoritarian impulses. It is usually understood in opposition to popular morality. Through the force of law, the amendment empowers those in government to punish their opponents while shielding their own, which would be an anathema to the principle of constitutional morality.
The fragility of democracy, as argued by Kim Lane Scheppele, lies precisely in the unsettling truth that many autocracies have emerged not by tearing up constitutions, but by exploiting them. Elections, though vital, provide accountability only at intervals; in the space between them, it is the opposition that serves as the most critical check on power. Strip democracy of a strong opposition, and a majority-backed government transforms from representative authority into a perilous concentration of unchecked power.
Opposition isn’t an enemy to the state but an essential participant in governance. Its role is to challenge, criticise, and hold the ruling government accountable. Opposition is expected to be “loyal” to the Constitution and democratic order and not to the ruling party. The opposition represents diverse perspectives of citizens who did not vote for the ruling party. This ensures that democracy includes all citizens and doesn’t end up becoming the tyranny of the majority. It further acts as a restraint against executive aggrandisement and authoritarian tendencies.
The proposed 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill, however, risks turning this principle on its head. Mandating the automatic removal of a minister held in custody for more than thirty days facing serious criminal charges, it creates a mechanism that could easily become a political weapon to stifle the opposition. Let us consider two scenarios. A union minister facing grave allegations of sexual harassment but never taken into custody would continue to enjoy the privileges of office. At the same time, a chief minister of an opposition-ruled state detained on corruption charges for 30 days would be stripped of authority automatically on the 31st day. This might pave the way for the ruling dispensation to police the political landscape.
In a country where investigative agencies are accused of selective targeting, the likelihood of this provision being applied impartially is very low. The selective application is not just hypothetical; it is highly predictable. Through the force of law, the amendment empowers those in government to punish their opponents while shielding their own. What might look like a measure to “cleanse” politics may in practice serve as a tool to delegitimise dissent and weaken opposition.
This strikes at the very heart of the democratic fabric. When opposition leaders are labelled as criminals or forced out of office through selective enforcement, the principle of having an opposition collapses. The amendment will also have a chilling effect on the opposition. Opposition members will not want to be on the wrong side of the ruling party and would therefore abandon their role to criticise and challenge the government. This would effectively mean an autocratic dispensation. If India drifts in this direction, the constitutional promise of pluralism and accountability will not just be undermined, but the principle of constitutionalism itself will be in danger.
The amendment also ostensibly violates the idea of democratic legitimacy. Ministers, chief ministers, and prime ministers are democratically elected and can be removed only when they lose the democratic mandate or are convicted. A detention or arrest of merely 30 days should not override the mandate that they enjoy. Politically motivated detention or allegation is a known fact in a democracy; giving it legitimacy through the amendment will virtually render the opposition ineffective.
The 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill may parade as a reform to cleanse politics, but in reality, it threatens to turn constitutional morality into a partisan weapon. By linking removal to mere detention, it risks converting suspicion into guilt and law into an instrument of political vendetta. In a system where investigative agencies already face charges of selective targeting, such a provision will not purge corruption; it will purge opposition.
Democracy does not die when constitutions are torn apart, but when they are hollowed from within. By silencing dissent and weakening opposition under the guise of constitutional morality, the amendment endangers pluralism, accountability, and the very spirit of constitutionalism. What it promises is not cleaner politics, but a quieter opposition, and that is the surest path to authoritarianism.
Laxmi Tanuja Siliveru is a practising lawyer, and Megha Kedia is an Assistant Professor at KLE Law College, Bengaluru. They both did their LLM from the National Law School of India University, Bengaluru.
